Why Is the Book Taking So Long?

 

People often ask me: “Why is the Columbia book coming out in January, when you and Mike finished writing it in March?”

The short answer is that the publisher needs a lot of time to ensure that you, the reader, will get a quality product.

And as eager as you readers are to see the book come out, Mike and I are doubly impatient to put the book into your hands. But we want to make sure that you get the best possible book. The story of Columbia deserves to be treated with dignity and presented in a first-class manner, so we took our time to do it properly from the outset.

I also get a lot of questions from aspiring authors about what goes into writing and publishing a book. Let me take a few minutes to summarize what the past two years has looked like for us.

As noted previously, Mike and I agreed on the overall subject and started working on scoping the book in April 2015. Interviews with key participants in the recovery and reconstruction convinced us that we needed to significantly expand the scope of the book to tell a broader story. By early September 2015, we felt we had the scope pretty well nailed down, and we started outlining the book.

Even before we began writing the book in depth, we spent nearly nine months searching for a literary agent and exploring possible publishers. Starting in September 2015, we wrote at least fifteen iterations of a book proposal and a sample chapter (which later became Chapter 1 in the book). In March 2016, we found a literary agent who was enthusiastic about helping us get our book published. Several publishers expressed interest, and we spent two months working out terms with the publisher who we thought would do the best job with the book. We also insisted that the book be released before February 1, 2018, which will be the fifteenth anniversary of the Columbia accident.

We finally contracted with Skyhorse Publishing in August 2016, nearly a year after we started the search process. Meanwhile, our research was still going on—eventually totaling more than 100 hours of interviews which generated over 600,000 words of interview transcripts! But we couldn’t really write the book until we ensured that we and the publisher were in complete agreement on the length of the book and how we intended to treat the subject matter. Our manuscript due date was set in the contract as March 15, 2017.

Writing the first draft of the manuscript took from September 2016 through January 2017. (For those interested in the writing process, that involved writing an average of 1,200 words per day, every day, during that period.) We solicited technical reviews for accuracy from many of the key sources for the book as we went along. Each chapter went through multiple revisions—correcting, tightening, expanding, fact checking, etc. (For those really interested in the mechanics of book writing, I used an app called Scrivener for managing all the reference material and writing the drafts. I exported the drafts into Word once they were ready for review.)

When the first draft of the entire book was complete, we sent the manuscript to several professional writers and editors to ask for their feedback. Their reviews took us into early February. Working with suggestions from the reviewers, we decided that we needed to re-write much of the book to make Mike’s part of the story even more personal by putting his experiences in first person rather than third person. And we needed to shorten the book by 10 percent, a daunting process that resulted in a much tighter read. Writing that second draft took us another month. Then came choosing the best representative photos out of hundreds available, writing the captions, and the detailed work of double-checking the end notes.

That brought us to our submission deadline in mid-March. We beat the due date in the contract by two days.

Whew.

Now the ball was in our editor’s court. The typical editor these days is working on about a dozen books simultaneously, all of which are in different stages of production. During the contracting phase, the publisher decides which “catalog” the book will be released under. In our case, it was Skyhorse’s Fall 2017 catalog, which covered books to be published between October 2017 and February 2018. The editor works backward from the release date in the catalog to determine the milestone dates. In our case, the book needed to be completely ready to go into production by the end of July this year.

We received our editor’s comments on the manuscript in mid-June. Thanks to all the time we spent having other reviewers go over the book, our editor had very minimal changes to our initial submission. We swapped the order of two chapters, moved four short sections from one chapter to a couple of other places in the book, and that was about it. Next, Skyhorse’s copyeditor reviewed the book for formatting, typos, grammar, consistency, etc. Again, very few changes needed to be made, and that process wrapped up about ten days ago. That was the final opportunity to make any substantive changes to the book.

This week, we received the “interior sample”—the first ninety pages of the book, so we can see how it will look when it’s typeset. Our editor wanted to be sure we liked the layout and overall look of the book.

Screen Shot 2017-07-21 at 3.07.27 PM
One page of the interior sample.

One thing that came up during the review of the interior sample was finally nailing down the subtitle for the book. You may be surprised to learn that authors don’t always get to choose the titles for their books. The author will suggest a title, but the editor will frequently recommend a different title that might be more likely to grab potential readers’ attention or show up better in online searches (“Search Engine Optimization,” or SEO). So we had a few exchanges with the editor about ideas for the subtitle for our book this week before we settled on one that we all agree summarizes the book in about ten words. Not an easy task.

The final pre-production phase, which should be in the next week or two, will be for us to review the galley proofs. This is a pdf of exactly how the book will be typeset, page by page, line by line. The authors have five days to review and approve it. Changes are very tightly controlled and limited to correcting errors. You need to do everything humanly possible to avoid making any changes that will affect pagination. And the contract allows the publisher to charge the author for every word change that’s not an error correction—so you know they’re serious! Also at this point, an indexing service will generate an index for the book.

Then the book goes into production. Mike and I essentially have no further input into the book from that point forward. Although the official release date is January 2, 2018, our editor assures us that we will have books in hand several weeks before that for us to sign and ship to people who pre-order from us!

So that’s the story of the book.

So far.

Sharing the Story at Spacefest VIII

Last month, I was privileged to be able to speak at Spacefest VIII in Tucson, Arizona about the recovery and reconstruction of Columbia.

For those of you who haven’t been able to attend a Spacefest, it’s an incredible experience. You’ll meet Gemini, Apollo, and Space Shuttle astronauts, planetary scientists, futurists, historians, artists, authors, and hundreds of everyday people who are enthused by space exploration. The wonderful people at Novaspace make this an experience you’ll never forget.

As the co-author of the upcoming book on the Columbia accident, I was invited to speak about the events of 2003. Joining me on the dais was astronaut Jerry Ross, who shared his first-hand accounts of working with the crew and in the search for the vehicle’s debris after the accident, as well as the near-miss he had on STS-27—the most heavily-damaged spacecraft ever to return safely.

I recorded the audio from the presentation and from the ensuing question-and-answer period. I’ve since incorporated a few more images and some video editing to help make the photos tell the story even more clearly. Jerry Ross graciously agreed to allow me to include his commentary in this video.

Here’s the link to the talk on YouTube.

I am NOT a practitioner of “Death by PowerPoint.” You’ll need to have the audio turned on as you watch this presentation, as there are no bullet-point slides—none. It’s all photos and a few maps, which illustrate the story I tell.

The video is one hour long. I hope you’ll enjoy it and learn from what one audience member called “a moving and surprisingly inspirational presentation”!

Jonathan and Jerry q and a
Jonathan Ward and Jerry Ross answer audience questions at Spacefest VIII. (Photo by Brad McKinnon)

Required Changes

A lot has been written about the recovery from the Columbia accident in terms of changes we needed to make to get back to flying the Shuttle again. In general, the changes fell into two categories. One bucket contained changes to hardware, the other were changes to management practices.

In the early summer of 2003, we didn’t know how much time we’d eventually have to make these changes—just that we’d take whatever time was necessary to get them done, and with the confidence we did them right. But based on the recovery from the Challenger accident of 1986, we figured we wouldn’t be flying again for a couple of years. Could be longer; could be a little quicker. But the charge to all of us was to get the work done correctly, first and foremost. Sort of like resolving a problem in the final throes of launch countdown – solve the problem first, then look up at the clock and see if you have any time left in which to launch.

That’s not to say we were lackadaisical about it. Hardly. We were well aware of the need to get flying again to the ISS. But once again, it was ‘schedule awareness’ vs ‘schedule pressure’. There was a difference from the time critical launch environment of course where technical problems were solved based solely on data, and bad decisions couldn’t be recalled. In the recovery period, lengthy, philosophical debates were fairly common. But decisions needed to be made and progress in the improvements needed to be real.

The foam loss problem on the external tank needed to be fixed. Adding the capabilities to inspect the Orbiter’s tiles and effect some level of repair prior to re-entry was also necessary. These were obviously the top two flight hardware upgrades undertaken. But each Project (Orbiter, ET, SRB, Ground Processing, etc.) was asked to essentially recertify their existing system as flight-worthy, or suggest upgrades aimed at improving safety margins. These suggestions would be debated at the Program-level change boards and either accepted for implementation (and funded) or not.

Changes weren’t too widespread for us at KSC and the Ground Processing directorate. For the most part, our work practices on the flight hardware were mature and adequate. Extra care was to be taken when working on the External Tank’s foam to avoid damage, but nothing too onerous.

One significant finding in the accident review that we were responsible for correcting was the inadequate ascent imagery. As you may recall, on Columbia‘s final launch one ground tracking camera was inoperable, another was out of focus, and the just sheer number of assets documenting the critical portion of ascent couldn’t guarantee the full suite of images necessary to help resolve issues. As a result, we undertook a complete review of the ‘imagery system’ composed of tracking video cameras, still photography, high-speed engineering film assets, and the Operational Television System (pad cameras). We needed to be sure we had enough visual documentation to address issues, and have confidence on launch day the assets were working and could ‘see’ the vehicle. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) even recommended we have Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) for the system. More on that in a moment.

In addition to improving the visible launch documentation we needed some sort of long-range tracking system that could detect issues long after ground-based cameras effectively lost sight of the vehicle. Later – the C-band radar system. Likewise, on-orbit imagery needed to be understood and policies firmed up to enlist help from the intelligence community if needed.

C-band radar dish
This 50-ft. C-band radar dish was installed near Haulover Canal north of the KSC launch complex, as one of three radar dishes used in the new Debris Radar System. The other two were on ships. (NASA photo)

For the sake of brevity, the final ground-based system we installed was one of guaranteeing adequate views at least through SRB separation, from three independent positions, and from both north of the pad and south of the pad. We needed close-in views, mid-length (2-5 miles), and longer-range views from 10 miles or beyond. No distance requirement was set, just that we had these three ‘zones’ covered. Obviously, siting the individual assets would be case-dependent. At least two cameras at each location added to the certainty of coverage. The status of each would be reported to the responsible system engineer on the launch team and relayed to us. They would be committed for launch during the hold at T-9 minutes.

What about the CAIB launch commit criteria requirement? What about clouds obstructing one or more views? What about night launches? Good questions.

The CAIB did not specify what type LCC they wanted, although in informal talks they were going after specific camera views and operability. Given the uncertainty of guaranteeing views, I opted to enact an LCC based solely on the system operating properly. The issue of adequate views (cloud coverage, one or more specific cameras being down, etc.) was left to judgment on launch day. That decision would be made jointly by me (as Launch Director) and the Mission Management Team chairperson. The CAIB accepted the idea, so we pressed on with buying and installing an elaborate collection of video and still cameras located north and south of the pad. And we installed a control system for the cameras close to or at the pad. It was that control system that had the LCC. On launch day, the pre-launch MMT chair and I would get information on the views we would get during ascent and would decide if we’d launch with anything less than the full complement.

We had a requirement to launch during the light of day for the Return to Flight mission. That mandate remained in place until we had confidence the foam loss issue was resolved, AND that the radar system could detect debris issues regardless of daylight. We relaxed the lighted-launch requirement starting with STS-116 in December 2006, the first night launch of a Shuttle since the Columbia accident.

The system proved to be a great addition to the safety for the astronauts and the vehicle. Never again would the vehicle be hidden from view during ascent. We had enough cameras to make up for one or two not working as designed and had all angles covered. Ground-based imagery never caused a scrub and always provided clear views of the vehicle – and plenty of them.

The Smoking Gun

The exclamation point that provided closure to the Columbia accident investigation was independent of the analysis of Columbia‘s debris and its data recorder.

Two days after the February 1, 2003 accident, the NASA Accident Investigation Team contacted the Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) near San Antonio for assistance in the accident investigation. SwRI had conducted previous studies for NASA on the effects of impacts of much smaller pieces of foam, cork insulation, and ice on shuttle tiles. NASA wanted incontrovertible proof that foam from the external tank was capable of inflicting mortal damage on the shuttle’s thermal protection system.

That foam could damage the wing seemed counterintuitive on many levels. How could a piece of lightweight insulation— about the density of Styrofoam and weighing less than two pounds—fall off the tank and cause that kind of damage? And wasn’t it traveling about the same speed as the shuttle?

In fact, analysis showed there was a significant velocity difference between the shuttle and the foam at the time of impact. NASA estimated that the shuttle was traveling faster than 1,500 mph—and accelerating—when the foam fell off the tank. After falling off, the foam immediately and rapidly decelerated due to air resistance. The block slowed to about 1,000 mph in the 0.2 seconds between when it came off the tank and when the shuttle’s wing impacted the foam. The relative difference in speeds between the shuttle and foam was therefore more than 500 mph.

The piece of foam that struck Columbia was four hundred times larger than the pieces tested previously by SwRI. Using a special compressed air cannon, SwRI planned to simulate the collision by firing foam blocks at more than 500 mph into samples of shuttle tiles and wing leading edge panels. High-speed cameras photographed the test firings and impacts, and over two hundred sensors measured the effects of the collisions.

By the time the equipment and procedures were ready for the first test on the landing gear door, the investigation had already narrowed its focus to the wing’s leading edge as the impact area. SwRI ran its test anyway using a landing gear door—one borrowed from Enterprise and subsequently covered with silica tiles—to check out the test equipment and processes. As expected, a grazing impact of foam, akin to what would have occurred in flight had the foam hit the underside of the wing, caused only minor damage to the tiles on the landing gear door.

Space shuttle wing leading edge panels are large, expensive, and made to order. The reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) material also wears and becomes more brittle over time, so SwRI could not use newly manufactured panels to get an accurate assessment of potential damage in its impact tests. The test panels would have to come from the wings of Discovery and Atlantis, the two orbiters that had flown about as many times as Columbia.

NASA decided to check out the test process first using Fiberglas leading edge wing panels from Enterprise, which was not designed to fly in space. Several test shots at Enterprise’s Fiberglas panels—which were stronger than the RCC panels on the flightworthy shuttles—produced scuff marks from the foam blocks, but no breakage. After getting its process and equipment calibrated, SwRI was now ready to try the tests with the space-flown RCC panels.

First, a foam block was fired at panel 6 from Discovery. The impact created a crack nearly six inches long in a rib supporting the leading edge, and it moved the panel enough to create a small gap in the T-seal between panels 6 and 7. This test proved that foam could damage the RCC. However, the damage incurred in this test would not have been severe enough to create the burn-through seen on Columbia. NASA estimated a hole of at least ten inches in diameter would have been needed for the wing to ingest a plasma stream large enough to create the damage shown in Columbia’s debris.

The next test target was panel 8, which had flown twenty-six times on Atlantis. Evidence from the reconstructed debris and the OEX recorder indicated that panel 8 was the probable site of the impact on Columbia’s wing.

At the test on Monday, July 7, 2003 the impact from the foam block blew a hole through the panel about sixteen inches by sixteen inches across, created several other cracks, and caused the T-seal to fail between panels 8 and 9. This was entirely consistent with the type of damage that caused Columbia’s demise.

Witnesses were incredulous, but the evidence was incontrovertible. NASA now had the smoking gun matching the fatal wound on Columbia. The test silenced lingering doubts that a foam strike alone was sufficient to damage the wing and doom the ship.

This text in this section is excerpted from the book “Bringing Columbia Home,” (c) 2017 by Mike Leinbach and Jonathan H. Ward. Video material is from NASA.

Tropical Storm Ernesto and the Half Rollback

Every now and then, a little creativity goes a long way…….

As noted in my previous post, we were charged with protecting the Kennedy Space Center workforce and the hardware. But of course, we were in the business to launch the Shuttle, not stay on the ground indefinitely while maximizing the safety statistics. The basic tenet for all of us was “Get work done, safely.” Apply that to all aspects of Shuttle processing and launch. Meeting the manifest was important. Launching was important. Doing it safely was paramount.

Decisions that could affect the manifest required me to consult with the Shuttle Program managers at Johnson Space Center (JSC)—and for good reason. The “Program” was “theirs”, not “mine”, or KSC’s. So for major decisions like rolling back for storms two people needed to agree: the Launch Director (me, at KSC) and the Operations Manager (the JSC manager stationed at KSC). We conferred and jointly made those major manifest-impacting decisions.

Flashback to late August, 2006. Atlantis was on the pad preparing for STS-115’s assembly mission to the ISS. Atlantis was originally scheduled to launch on August 27. Our ground team made an unprecedented replacement of some parts on the shuttle with a week to go until launch, and we maintained the schedule. Then on August 25, one of the most powerful lightning bolts ever recorded at Kennedy Space Center hit the lightning mast at the top of the launch pad’s Fixed Service Structure. We needed at least 24 hours to assess the damage from that strike, moving the launch date to August 29.

That was all trouble enough. But meanwhile, a minor tropical weather disturbance had been forming in the Caribbean. Unimpressive—but like all such systems, we would monitor it in case the unexpected happened and it became a threat to us.

True to form, after days of watching the storm, now named Ernesto, its track and forward speed appeared likely to affect Florida’s Space Coast while Atlantis was still preparing for launch.

Decisions were coming, no doubt. We began the initial work to roll the shuttle back to the Vehicle Assembly Building as a precaution. This work could easily be reversed and still hold the launch date if the storm took an unexpected turn away from us. Discussions with the 45th Space Wing meteorologists were now being held every six hours to coincide with the official forecasts from the National Hurricane Center.

As Ernesto crossed western Cuba and headed into the Florida Straits, it grew to hurricane strength. The frequency of our calls went up to the rare every three hours, and then almost continuously. Ernesto was on a track to enter extreme south Florida and head up the eastern side of the peninsula, essentially right at us.

Meanwhile, Atlantis had a launch date that was sandwiched in between several other arriving and departing vehicles at the International Space Station, other Eastern Test Range operations, and other constraints that were beyond our control. If we didn’t launch before about the 12th of September (as I recall), we would have to stand down for another two weeks or so. Schedule awareness (not schedule pressure) was real.

The decision was coming. Stay at the pad and risk exceeding our wind limits and possible Shuttle damage? Or roll back to the safety of the VAB and miss the near term launch opportunity?

After numerous tense calls with the Launch Weather Officer, LeRoy Cain (the JSC Ops Manager) and I made the decision to play it safe and roll back. It was the morning of the day before the storm’s predicted arrival, approximately 40-44 hours hence. Rolling early enough to beat the winds was the game we needed to play.

But what if the storm changed course and became less of a threat? That became a real possibility after the wheels were already in motion.

As the ground operations team was rolling Atlantis off the pad for its eight-hour trip back to the VAB, the question came to me: Could we reverse the roll and return to the pad IF the storm really did weaken and veer off course, permitting us to stay at the pad?

The Crawler-Transporter (CT), built for Apollo, went in only one direction: forward. Forward toward the pad, and forward toward the VAB. What? The CT had two control stations—one on the east face, one on the west face. It was from either of these “cockpits” that the crew drove the vehicle. There was no way to turn that mammoth vehicle around on the crawlerway. To go the other way, you’d just stop, get out of the western control cab en route to the VAB, get into the eastern cab, and then start driving again, this time toward the pad.

I asked the Support Test Manager if his guys could do this. He went pale. Never before even contemplated, no procedures allowing it, the time required, etc., etc. all indicated a negative response was likely. But Bobby Briggs, being the best STM at KSC, said he’d “look into it.” His eventual answer was that if we decided before the CT was halfway to the VAB, his guys could do it.

Perfect answer.

Armed with that, I went to LeRoy Cain to see what he thought of the idea. He liked it immediately. If the storm veered away in the next four hours or so, we could stop and return to the pad.

For the sake of brevity, here’s the punchline. We did stop the roll and went back to the pad following the “final” call with the LWO, Kathy Winters. The storm would start to weaken coming up on its overland track, AND the track had it going a bit farther to our east. Atlantis would be on the best side of the storm.

As all of us watched the storm progress up the state from the safety of our homes. The favorable track was verified. It passed to the east of the pad by approximately 40 miles, as I recall. Winds remained within limits and no damage resulted.

We launched successfully Atlantis on September 9, 2006. Astronaut Brent Jett commanded the mission. He had been an integral part of the crew recovery effort after the Columbia accident.

As I look back on this achievement, I can’t help but think about this being just one example of team creativity and their can-do, will-do approach to all operational challenges. I can’t put into words how proud of them I was, and am to this day.

This ‘partial rollback’ was needed to do two things – protect the vehicle, and, because of the way things turned out, preserve a launch opportunity. Get work done, safely.

Damn, it was fun!

Hurricane Season and Rollbacks

June 1 thru November 30. The Atlantic Hurricane Season. As June 1 passed I was reminded how much ‘fun’ it was to experience.

From the earliest days of our manned spaceflight programs, the Launch Director was responsible for two things that outweighed all others, including launch itself. These were to protect the safety of the workforce, and to protect the flight and ground hardware. Obviously, these are everyone’s responsibility, and everyone took them very seriously. But when major processing decisions were required that had significant safety and/or processing implications, the LD made the final call.

Some of those decisions are well-known, the final decision to launch being the most obvious. Others were also the responsibility of the LD but not as visible. The decision to roll the vehicle out to the launch pad, establishing and enforcing the employee work time rules, and approving personnel exposure to launch pad hazards after external tank (ET) fueling are a few. The decision to roll the vehicle back to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) from the launch pad was also given to the LD (along with a Shuttle Program rep that I’ll explain later).

What could drive us to roll back? Remember the woodpeckers and the damage they did to the ET that couldn’t be fully repaired at the pad? (That was STS-70, in June 1995.) How about the hydrogen leaks in the 1990s?

There was another event that could force us to bring the stack back to the VAB for safekeeping – threatening hurricanes.

If you recall, the vehicle spent about a month at the pad in preparation for launch. Unlike expendable rockets that can spend as little as one day at the pad, the Shuttle needed quite a bit more preparation time before launch. Payload installation, ordnance installations, hypergolic fueling, TCDT—those are just four of the numerous pre-flight jobs that had to be done at the pad. They were required for every mission regardless of the calendar.

Enter Hurricane Season. The Space Shuttle would spend that month of prep time on its seaside launch pad, less than ½ mile from the usually tranquil Atlantic Ocean. On occasion, that tranquility would be broken by the effects from tropical storms and hurricanes. If the Shuttle’s presence on the pad and tropical weather coincided, tough decisions would be required.

Protect the hardware. Protect the people.

The Shuttle program benefitted from the weather forecasts and advice from some of the best meteorologists in the world. The 45th Space Wing of the US Air Force provided weather support for us. Every day—not just during hurricane season, but every day—I would hold a 10-minute call with them for the daily forecast. Numerous processing groups would tie in to benefit from the information and how it might affect their work plans that day. If tropical systems began to form, the intensity on the calls would increase. If there were also a Shuttle at the pad, it would take on an additional air of importance and urgency. Daily calls would increase to twice per day, then every six hours, or even more as the threat got closer.

Ultimately, if the storm track, intensity, and speed combined to actually threaten KSC in the near future we would need to roll the Shuttle back to the VAB to ride out the storm. We could hunker down at the pad if the winds didn’t exceed 60 knots. But if the forecast had higher winds, we needed to get to the safety of the VAB, and this needed to be done early enough that allowed the workers time to get home to deal with their own, final storm preparations.

A lot went into those discussions, but for this entry it can be summarized as balancing the desire to stay at the pad and launch on time vs taking the protection option and delaying launch at least two weeks. But remember: the top priority was safety for the people and hardware. Launch schedules were secondary. But the balance needed to be struck, and it was the responsibility of the Launch Director and the Shuttle Program Manager (delegated to his KSC rep) to do it.

Why would it delay launch at least two weeks if we rolled back to the VAB? The three sets of required tasks, when combined, needed about two weeks to complete—rollback preparations including the roll itself, stay time in the VAB as the storm passed by, and then roll back out and re-perform pad operations undone in Step 1.

To get ready to roll back was at least two full days of activity—usually three—and was done with the storm bearing down on us and our families and homes. How long it took to prepare for rollback depended how close to launch we were when the decision to roll was made. The closer to launch meant more work had been performed that needed to be undone. The Payload Bay Doors needed to be closed after securing the payload. The aft compartment of the Orbiter needed to be closed with special doors, the side hatch closed, etc. Add to these relatively obvious preps things like hypergolic and ordnance systems securing, Pad-to-MLP disconnections (power, comm, gases, data lines, etc.), and you get the idea. The “final” disconnection was this contraption called the ‘9099 interface’ – a large bank of data and power lines on the side of the MLP. Once disconnected, all the work done to verify those systems were launch-ready became history—work that would have to be completely re-done once the Shuttle came back to the launch pad.

We had to roll the crawler out to the launch pad. The rollback itself was typically eight hours or so followed by rudimentary connections of the MLP to the VAB shore systems. Then the final workers could go home and shutter their houses.

Stay time on the VAB was storm-dependent of course, but let’s say three to four days until the “all clear” was declared to reopen KSC. If storm damage existed that would prevent normal work, add that repair time.

The workforce returned to work and got ready to roll back out to the pad. Two days minimum to get ready. Roll out was the same eight hours, and usually at night in the summer to avoid the afternoon thunderstorms. Once at the pad, you have to reconnect everything (reconnecting each interface means going through the complete set of checks to ensure that the connectors are properly mated again) and get back into the same posture as before the decision was made to ride out the storm in the VAB. Add back those three days or so. Then pick a new launch day, verifying that the new launch date doesn’t impact other planned launches at the Cape, other vehicles arriving at or departing the International Space Station, and so on.

All told, the decision to ride out a storm in the VAB meant an impact to the launch schedule of about two weeks.

No magic, just a lot of (necessary) work to protect the flight hardware.

Next week: Tropical Storm Ernesto and the “Half-Rollback”

The Stafford-Covey Return-to-Flight Task Group

International treaty required the United States to complete the core assembly of the International Space Station, up through the installation of Node 2 (later called the Harmony module) as soon as possible. NASA had previously committed to the US Congress that Node 2—onto which the European Space Agency’s Columbus module and the Japanese Kibo module would be berthed—would be launched by February 2004.

While meeting that date was clearly impossible after the Columbia accident, NASA was still compelled to complete its share of the work on the ISS as soon as possible. There were still many flights needed to complete the ISS’s central truss and expand its solar power system before Node 2 could be installed. None of that work was possible without the shuttle. The modules were already built, but there was no other way to get them into space and support the spacewalks necessary to install them. NASA therefore had to get the shuttle flying again.

In May 2003, three months after the accident and before the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) had completed its investigation, NASA expected to resume shuttle operations by the end of 2003 or early 2004. NASA wanted to be sure that it was not letting schedule and political pressure force the agency into taking undue risks.

In early May, NASA Deputy Administrator Fred Gregory announced that former astronaut Lt. General Thomas Stafford had been requested to head a group to provide an independent assessment of NASA’s return-to-flight plans. On May 22, 2003, NASA named former shuttle astronaut Richard Covey to report to Stafford and lead a working group to oversee and test NASA’s compliance with the CAIB’s findings and recommendations. Some of the members of the panel included former Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig, Apollo 8 astronaut Bill Anders (who was also the retired CEO of General Dynamics), and former NASA Launch Director Bob Sieck, among a host of other government and industry executives and technical experts.

NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe said that NASA would only decide that it was safe to fly the shuttle again when the Administrator had the Stafford-Covey Task Group’s independent confirmation that NASA had fully complied with the CAIB’s recommendations.

Stafford Covey group jsc2003e56782
NASA’s Joy Huff shows a space shuttle leading edge subsystems panel to members of the Stafford-Covey Task Group in August 2003. From left: Dr. Amy Donahue, David Lengyel, Dr. Katherine Clark, Richard Covey, and William Wegner. (NASA photo)

The Task Group went into full operation once the CAIB’s report was issued in August 2003. The CAIB made 15 specific recommendations that NASA needed to address before the shuttle could return to flight. Many of those findings required extensive changes to hardware, procedures, and management practices.

NASA’s hopes of flying again in 2003 or 2004 quickly were overtaken by the realization that there was a long and difficult road ahead. By December 2003, the planned launch date had moved to September 2004. However, an interim report by the Stafford-Covey Task Group that month said that “progress on the many recommendations is uneven” and that it was too soon to say whether that new launch date was possible. The Task Group’s interim report also chided NASA for not being timely in responding to some requests for information.

It was not comfortable information for O’Keefe to hear. However, it meant that the Task Group was doing its job of being “an umpire calling balls and strikes in a zone defined by the CAIB recommendations.”

The Task Group issued additional interim reports in April 2004 and January 2005, noting progress as well as areas that still required attention.

By June 2005, NASA had closed out all but three of the CAIB’s recommendations. The Task Group believed that the three remaining recommendations were so challenging that NASA could not comply completely with the intent of the CAIB. For example, the most contentious open item was a vaguely-worded recommendation that NASA have the ability to repair the “widest possible range of damage” when the shuttle was on orbit.

In July 2005, the Task Group was satisfied that NASA had done everything in its power to make the shuttle as safe as possible to fly again, and they told the Administrator that NASA had met the intent of the CAIB’s requirements for returning to flight. The Task Group’s final report made it clear, however, that it was up to the NASA Administrator and his staff—not the CAIB or the Task Group—to determine if the remaining risk was low enough to allow the shuttle to fly.

Shuttle Discovery launched on the STS-114 mission on July 26, 2005. Although the external tank unexpectedly (alarmingly) shed foam again, the safety inspection and repair techniques that NASA developed in the wake of the CAIB report ensured that the crew was able to complete their mission and return safely to Earth.